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“AT HOME” IN GEORGIA:
THE HIDDEN DANGER OF REGISTERING TO DO
BUSINESS IN GEORGIA
Brian P. Watt, Esq.* & W. Alex Smith, Esq.**
INTRODUCTION
Georgia law prohibits any foreign corporation—a corporation with
an originating registration initiated in a state other than Georgia—
from transacting business in the state until it obtains a certificate of
authority from the Georgia Secretary of State.1 Attorneys advise
foreign corporations to register to transact business in Georgia as a
matter of course, and business owners readily comply. On the
surface, registration appears innocuous—submit paperwork and pay a
fee to the state. In return, the corporation reaps the benefits of
transacting business throughout Georgia.
But what often evades business owners—and some practitioners—
is that registering to do business in Georgia operates as a veiled
forfeiture of a fundamental right—the corporation’s right to due
process, which imposes a limit on the state’s exercise of jurisdiction
over the corporation.2 By virtue of its registration, a foreign
corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Georgia.3
That means it must respond to any lawsuit filed against it in a
Georgia court.4 The foreign corporation must do so no matter how
remote the lawsuit’s connection is to Georgia.5

* Partner, Troutman Sanders. J.D., University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., University of
Georgia.
** Associate, Troutman Sanders. J.D., University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., University of
Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) (2017).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.
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Georgia is not unique in its registration requirement. Every state in
the Union has a similar statute.6 But very few states require a foreign
corporation to forfeit the guarantees of due process as a condition for
transacting business in the state. Georgia is one of them.
The current state of Georgia law is bad practice. It encourages
forum shopping, and it cools interstate commerce by potentially
deterring foreign corporations from registering to do business in
Georgia. Usually, a Georgia resident would rather file a lawsuit
against a foreign corporation in Georgia to avail himself of an
ostensibly friendly forum. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized, “[N]o doctorate in astrophysics is required to deduce that
trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff’s
preference.”7 More significantly, however, a plaintiff can avail
himself of favorable Georgia procedural law—including, critically,
Georgia’s statutes of limitations8—simply by filing his lawsuit in
Georgia rather than in another forum. A recent case decided by the
Georgia Court of Appeals exemplifies the forum shopping that
Georgia law currently allows: a Georgia resident filed suit against a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Maryland based on alleged tortious conduct that occurred in Texas.9
The court held that the corporation is subject to jurisdiction in
Georgia based solely on its registration to do business in the state.10
The potential for exploitation aside, Georgia law likely violates
federal law. Recently, the United States Supreme Court transformed
the landscape for the exercise of general jurisdiction, greatly limiting
the fora in which a foreign corporation can be subject to general

6. Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1363–64 n.109, 1364–65 nn.111–12 (2015).
7. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. See Gray v. Armstrong, 474 S.E.2d 280, 281 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting statutes of limitations
are procedural and thus the law of the forum applies notwithstanding where the tort was committed).
9. Ward v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. A19A0826, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct.
24, 2019).
10. Id. at *6–10.
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jurisdiction.11 Georgia law must be reformed in light of modern-day
strictures of federal due process.
I. A Brief Overview of Personal Jurisdiction
A state’s courts can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only if
that power satisfies two prerequisites: (1) state law—typically the
state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.12 As
discussed below, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the
exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation registered
to do business in Georgia is authorized by state law.13 We do not
question the court’s interpretation of Georgia law for the purposes of
this article. Rather, our focus is whether the court’s holding comports
with the second step: the protections of due process.
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in
not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”14 Unless
the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts,” due process
prevents a state from exercising jurisdiction over the rights or
interests of a nonresident defendant.15 Due process can be satisfied
under either one of two categories of jurisdiction: specific or
general.16
The exercise of specific jurisdiction requires that the litigation
arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state.17 Typically, that means the conduct underlying the claims of
the lawsuit takes place in the forum state. It is the controversy itself
that establishes jurisdiction. If the lawsuit is not sufficiently
11. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
12. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).
13. See infra Part II.
14. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
15. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
16. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73 n.15.
17. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014).
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connected to the defendant’s contacts with the state, specific
jurisdiction is not satisfied, and the court cannot preside over the
lawsuit.
General jurisdiction, by contrast, focuses solely on the sufficiency
of the defendant’s contacts with the state. A state that exercises
general jurisdiction can “hear any and all claims” against the
defendant.18 As the United States Supreme Court recognized, “Even
when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and
the foreign corporation.”19
After the Supreme Court issued its watershed opinion in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington in 1945,20 the exercise of
specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was subject to a
relatively defined analysis. A court examined whether there existed
“an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the
forum State.’ When no such connection exists, specific jurisdiction is
lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected
activities in the State.”21
The exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,
however, remained unresolved. Most courts relied upon the nebulous
standard espoused in International Shoe, which posited that there
may exist “instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature” as to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction.22 Yet over the next sixtyfive years, the Court issued only two opinions discussing general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.23 Courts were left without
18. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
19. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
21. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776 (2017) (quoting Goodyear,
564 U.S. at 919) (citation omitted).
22. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
23. See generally Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
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much guidance to define the contacts necessary to subject a
corporation to general jurisdiction.
It was in this context that the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded
that a foreign corporation’s registration to do business rendered it
subject to general jurisdiction in Georgia.
II. The Supreme Court of Georgia Holds that All Foreign
Corporations Registered to Do Business in Georgia Are Subject to
General Jurisdiction in the State
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Klein24 analyzed whether Georgia could exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation registered to do business in the
state. The plaintiff was a passenger involved in a car wreck in
Georgia.25 Allstate insured the car under a New Jersey policy. 26 The
plaintiff sued Allstate in Georgia for injuries sustained in the
collision.27 Allstate moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction, arguing that any nexus between the claims and Allstate’s
activities in Georgia was too tenuous to satisfy the first step of the
jurisdictional analysis—the Georgia Long-Arm Statute.28
The trial court granted the motion, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the court could exercise specific jurisdiction
because the suit was sufficiently connected to Allstate’s contacts with
Georgia.29 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the exercise of
jurisdiction over Allstate, but for a different reason. 30 The court
focused on the language of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, which
applies exclusively to jurisdiction over Georgia nonresidents.31 The
court reasoned that because the statute defines nonresident as
(1952).
24. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992).
25. Id. at 864.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Klein, 422 S.E.2d at 864–65.
31. Id. at 865.
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including only foreign corporations not authorized to transact
business in the state, a foreign corporation registered to do business
in Georgia must be considered a resident for the purposes of
jurisdiction.32 The court concluded:
As a resident, such a foreign corporation may sue or be sued to
the same extent as a domestic corporation. Therefore, a plaintiff
wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation authorized to do
business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal jurisdiction
parameters of [the Long-Arm Statute], including the requirement
that a cause of action arise out of a defendant’s activities within
the state.33

In other words, a foreign corporation registered to do business is
subject to general jurisdiction.
The court, however, made short shrift of the second step of the
jurisdictional analysis—the due process inquiry. In a footnote, the
court noted that whether the exercise of general jurisdiction over a
registered foreign corporation comported with due process had “not
been challenged in this case.”34 The court surmised simply that “it
appears” that such jurisdiction “does not run afoul of the ‘minimum
contacts’ requirement of procedural due process.”35
III. United States Supreme Court’s Recent General Jurisdiction
Jurisprudence
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court finally revisited the
exercise of general jurisdiction. The Court’s decision in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown36 restricted the exercise of
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation tremendously.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 865 n.3.
Id.
See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown
In Goodyear, plaintiffs filed suit in North Carolina against foreign
corporations, alleging that a tire produced by the companies caused
the death of two children in France.37 The foreign corporations
manufactured tires primarily for sale in foreign markets.38 A small
number of their tires, however, were distributed in North Carolina by
affiliates, although the type of tire involved in the accident was never
distributed in the state.39
The corporations moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction.40 The trial court denied the motion, and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.41 The court held that the
corporations were subject to general jurisdiction, stating that the
defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts” with the state
because they placed their tires in the stream of commerce without
any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in
North Carolina.42
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.43
The Court reasoned that the manufacturers’ contacts with the forum
were too attenuated to empower North Carolina to adjudicate claims
unrelated to those contacts.44 The Court established the proper
standard for analyzing whether a state’s exercise of general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation comports with due process:
the corporation’s affiliations with the state must be “so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.”45 The Court identified a corporation’s place of incorporation
and principal place of business as the “paradigm” forum(s) in which

37. Id. at 920–21.
38. Id. at 921.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 921–22.
41. Id. at 922.
42. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 922 (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)).
43. Id. at 931.
44. Id. at 929.
45. Id. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
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“the corporation is fairly regarded as at home” for the purposes of
general jurisdiction.46
Moreover, the Court identified its decision in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. as the “textbook case of general jurisdiction
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not
consented to suit in the forum.”47 In Perkins, the Court concluded
that Ohio courts could exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation when the president of the company temporarily relocated
the entity’s headquarters to Ohio during World War II, reasoning that
the corporation’s “sole wartime business activity was conducted in
Ohio . . . .”48
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman
Three years later, the Supreme Court again examined the contacts
necessary to render a foreign corporation subject to general
jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,49 residents of Argentina sued
a German-based vehicle manufacturer in California federal court,
alleging that an Argentinian subsidiary of the manufacturer
collaborated to kidnap, detain, and kill Argentinian workers.50
Jurisdiction was predicated on the California contacts of a Delaware
subsidiary of the defendant that distributed the defendant’s cars in
California.51 The defendant moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction, and the trial court granted the motion.52 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the defendant was subject to
general jurisdiction because its subsidiary’s contacts with California
were substantial and could be imputed to the defendant.53

46. Id. at 924.
47. Id. at 928 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air. Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
48. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929.
49. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
50. Id. at 122.
51. Id. at 123.
52. Id. at 124.
53. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 930–31 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
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The Supreme Court reversed, opining that approving jurisdiction
“in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business’ . . . is unacceptably
grasping.”54 The Court reiterated that the “essentially at home”
standard governs the exercise of general jurisdiction and requires
contacts so continuous and systematic as to render the corporation
“comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.”55 Even assuming
the subsidiary’s contacts were imputable to the defendant, the Court
held that the exercise of general jurisdiction ran afoul of the
“essentially at home” standard and noted that “the same global reach
would presumably be available in every other State in which [the
subsidiary]’s sales are sizable.”56 Such “[e]xercises of personal
jurisdiction so exorbitant . . . are barred by due process constraints on
the assertion of adjudicatory authority,” and only an “exceptional
case” such as Perkins would permit general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation.57 The Court stressed that due process required
courts to assess not only the corporation’s footprint in the forum
state, but also “an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their
entirety, nationwide[,] and worldwide. A corporation that operates in
many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”58
IV. Klein Likely No Longer Comports with Due Process
Georgia courts have yet to meaningfully revisit the exercise of
general jurisdiction after Goodyear and Daimler. No court has
overturned or questioned Klein. Indeed, the Georgia Court of
Appeals recently held in Ward v. Marriott International, Inc. that it
was bound to apply Klein in determining that a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Maryland was subject to
general jurisdiction in Georgia based solely on its registration to do

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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business in Georgia.59 The court tersely rejected the corporation’s
argument that recent United States Supreme Court precedent
foreclosed the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation in Georgia merely by virtue of its registration to do
business, reasoning that Klein itself recognized its holding “comports
with the requirements of federal procedural due process.”60 As
discussed above in Part II, however, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Klein expressly acknowledged that the constitutionality of exercising
general jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation “has not
been challenged in this case, addressed by the parties, or ruled on by
the lower courts.”61 The Klein court simply noted “it appears” its
holding “does not run afoul” of procedural due process
requirements.62 Klein’s reconsideration is overdue. The foreign
corporation in Ward has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
Georgia Supreme Court;63 Ward may present the court with an
excellent opportunity to revisit Klein and to ensure Georgia law
comports with the guarantees of federal due process.
A. The Exercise of General Jurisdiction Over a Foreign
Corporation by Virtue of Its Registration to Transact Business in
Georgia Violates Due Process
After Goodyear and Daimler, it is clear that a foreign
corporation’s registration to do business cannot itself rise to the level
of “continuous and systematic” affiliations to “essentially render it at
home” within the forum state.64 As the United States Supreme Court
recognized, the “paradigm all-purpose forums” are the corporation’s
place of incorporation and its principal place of business.65 Outside
59. Ward v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. A19A0826, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, at *6–10 (Ga. Ct. App.
Oct. 24, 2019).
60. Id. at *8–10.
61. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 865 n.3 (Ga. 1992).
62. Id.
63. Ward, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, petition for cert. filed, (Ga. Nov. 13, 2019) (No. S20C0485).
64. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
65. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 118.
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of those forums, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in
only an “exceptional case” in which the corporation’s operations are
“so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at
home in that State.”66 The commonplace business registration cannot,
by itself, render a foreign corporation subject to any kind of claim in
the state. Such a pervasive exercise of power would subject a
corporation to general jurisdiction in every state it transacts business
and would fly in the face of modern strictures of due process. Klein
cannot survive on this basis.
Courts that have taken up the issue resoundingly have held that
registration to do business cannot render a foreign corporation
subject to general jurisdiction. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a foreign corporation’s
registration subjected the corporation to general jurisdiction in
Florida, reasoning that “[a]fter Daimler, there is ‘little room’ to argue
that compliance with a state’s ‘bureaucratic measures’ render a
corporation at home in a state.”67 Several state supreme courts have
concluded that subjecting a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction
by virtue of registration would expose “properly registered foreign
corporations to an ‘unacceptably grasping’ and ‘exorbitant’ exercise
of jurisdiction” contrary to Goodyear and Daimler.68 Numerous
federal courts have relied upon similar reasoning in spurning prior
precedent.69

66. Id. at 139 n.19.
67. Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 2016)).
68. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 141 (Del. 2016) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138);
see also Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., Nos. 1170244, 1170294, 1170336, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 63, at *16–20
(Ala. June 28, 2019); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 10 (Mont. 2018); Segregated Account of
Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 83 (Wis. 2017).
69. See, e.g., Humphries v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV-17-01606-PHX-JJT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
50632 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2018); Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 227 F. Supp. 3d 249 (N.D.N.Y.
2016); Dimitrov v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 06332, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170990 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
22, 2015); Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 676 (S.D. Miss. 2015); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:14-cv-01492-TWP-DKL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139597 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14,
2015).
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B. A Foreign Corporation Should Not Be Deemed to Have
Consented to General Jurisdiction when It Registers to Transact
Business in Georgia
Although Klein can no longer comport with modern-day strictures
of due process, it is possible that Klein’s ghost survives via the
doctrine of consent.
It is well-established that a foreign corporation can consent to a
state’s jurisdiction by agreement or by defending a lawsuit without
challenging jurisdiction. When a defendant consents to jurisdiction,
his due process rights are deemed to be satisfied “because it is just
and fair to require the defendant to defend a suit in a forum to which
it previously agreed.”70
Conceivably, a corporation’s registration could be read as consent
to jurisdiction.71 Some courts have held that the due process strictures
recognized in Goodyear and Daimler are bypassed by a corporation’s
consent to jurisdiction via registration.72 Those courts rely chiefly on
the United States Supreme Court’s 1917 opinion in Pennsylvania
Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., in which the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s
holding that a foreign corporation consented to general jurisdiction
by virtue of its appointment of an agent in Missouri in compliance
with the state’s registration statute.73 The courts reason that because
Goodyear and Daimler do not address consent, Pennsylvania Fire
remains good law, and a state is free to conclude that registration acts
as consent to jurisdiction.74
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled
Pennsylvania Fire. Nor does Goodyear or Daimler discuss consent.75
70. DeLeon, 426 P.3d at 5–6.
71. See id. at 5 (“Consent jurisdiction is an independent basis for jurisdiction.”).
72. Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977 (E.D. Mo. 2016).
73. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96–97 (1917).
74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., No. A-1-CA-26402, 2018 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M.
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018); McDonald AG Inc. v. Syngenta AG (In re Sygenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig.),
No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65312 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016).
75. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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Although the continuing viability of Pennsylvania Fire raises
difficult questions, a majority of courts that have addressed the issue
have concluded that Pennsylvania Fire and the consent-byregistration doctrine no longer comport with modern-day notions of
due process. Courts have reasoned that “Pennsylvania Fire is now
simply too much at odds with the approach to general jurisdiction
adopted in Daimler”76 and “reflect[s] the reasoning of an era when
states could not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
absent the appointment of an agent for service of process.”77 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has “caution[ed] against reliance on cases
‘decided in the era dominated by’ the ‘territorial thinking’” before the
“transformative decision on personal jurisdiction” in International
Shoe.78
Klein was not decided on the basis of consent.79 The court never
mentioned consent (or Pennsylvania Fire), and its cursory analysis of
the constitutionality of the definition for nonresident was predicated
on sufficient minimum contacts.80 If consent were the basis for Klein,
there would be no reason to assess whether the party had minimum
contacts with Georgia.
Moreover, under Georgia law, a person or entity consents or
voluntarily waives a known right only where its “acts or omissions to
act, relied on, should be so manifestly consistent with and indicative
of an intention to voluntarily relinquish a then known particular right
or benefit, that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible.”81 It seems a bridge too far to suggest that Georgia’s
76. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 638 (2d Cir. 2016).
77. Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d
70, 82 (Wis. 2017).
78. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1557–58 (2017) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138
n.18).
79. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992). Although a few authorities
have stated that Klein was decided on the basis of consent, those authorities have not addressed the case
in detail and are not persuasive. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2018 N.M. App. LEXIS 78, at *32–33.
80. See generally Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863.
81. Ga. Power Co. v. O’Bryant, 313 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Jones v. Roberts
Marble Co., 84 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)); see also Hardy v. Lucio, 578 S.E.2d 224, 226
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal for insufficient process where movant had not manifested
intent to waive service); Millard v. Millard, 419 S.E.2d 718, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming
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registration statute implies consent to general jurisdiction when the
text of the statute does not mention consent or any explicit reference
to general jurisdiction.82
Goodyear and Daimler establish that the exercise of general
jurisdiction simply because a corporation does business in the state
violates due process, and the end run around that principle via
consent is difficult to jibe with modern notions of due process. 83 This
is particularly true where courts conclude that foreign corporations
waive the right to due process because registration acts as an implied
consent to jurisdiction. As the Second Circuit opined:
If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an instate agent—without an express consent to general jurisdiction—
nonetheless sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit
consent, every corporation would be subject to general
jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler’s
ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief.84

Because Georgia’s registration statute does not expressly provide
that a foreign corporation consents to general jurisdiction by virtue of
its registration, due process seemingly requires Klein to be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Georgia’s exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign
corporations stands out as a sore thumb, wrenching due process
rights from corporations that endeavor to provide business to the
state. Georgia labels itself “one of the top pro-business environments
in the nation.”85 Yet, as the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized,
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where movant had not waived defense).
82. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) (2017). Compare O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) with 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5301(a) (1981).
83. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917
(2011).
84. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016).
85. Pro-Business, GEORGIA®, http://www.georgia.org.dev1.milesmediagroup.com/competitive-
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“If the cost of doing [business] is that those foreign corporations will
be subject to general jurisdiction in [Georgia], they rightly may
choose not to do so.”86 Klein must be revisited. It makes business
sense, and it likely is required by federal law.

advantages/pro-business/ [https://perma.cc/R735-WT46] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
86. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016).
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